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Broker Recommendations and Mutual Fund Trades 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate the alignment of mutual fund trades with brokers’ recommendations and 
their associated performance. Using 2,730 funds with 44,315 fund-periods between 1994 
and 2005, we find that more than 20% of funds adjust their portfolios in line with brokers’ 
recommendations. However, funds that trade counter to these recommendations, on 
average, earn superior excess returns. This superior performance is most pronounced in 
small funds holding less-liquid stocks that trade more actively, and we attribute this to 
their private information having greater incremental value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G2, G11, G14, G23 
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Broker Recommendations and Mutual Fund Trades 
 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) is a commercial information provider that 
reports analysts’ recommendations on a five point ordinal scale ranging from “strong 
buy” to “sell”. These are averaged to produce monthly consensus recommendations, 
which are purchased by institutional investors and brokers. In an efficient market, the 
information contained in brokers’ recommendations, which are themselves a synthesis of 
available information, should be rapidly incorporated into the price of the stocks they 
recommend. Once these adjustments occur, the recommendations should have little 
further value, and investors that use them to guide their trades should be unable to earn 
excess returns.   
From one month to the next, less than 35% of the mean brokers’ recommendations 
reported by IBES change. Accordingly, the majority of standing recommendations should 
have no pecuniary value, and be employed only by those who believe that the market is 
inefficient. However, Elton, Gruber and Grossman (1986) demonstrate that excess returns 
are possible by using brokers’ recommendations to create hypothetical portfolios of 
stocks. Changes to recommendations provide greater returns, but standing 
recommendations also contain valuable information. Significant excess returns are earned 
in the month of publication of the recommendation, and in the following month. Stickel 
(1995) and Womack (1996) focus on changes to the recommendations with event study 
methodologies, and also find excess returns are possible. Indeed, Womack (1996) finds 
that excess returns can persist for six months after the change. 
The practical value of brokers’ recommendations is investigated by Barber, Lehavy, 
McNichols, and Trueman (2001), who examine the returns from portfolios formed using 
consensus recommendations, and reformed at various intervals. With more frequent 
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portfolio reformation, gross excess returns for the most highly (lowly) recommended 
portfolios increase (decrease), however, transaction costs also increase to the extent that 
net excess returns are no longer positive. However, as they note, investors that are 
required to trade for other reasons and would, in any case, incur transaction costs, are 
better served by buying stocks that are highly recommended, and selling those with low 
recommendations. 
Mutual funds hold portfolios of stocks which they continuously adjust to acquire 
favored stocks and to respond to sales and redemptions. We add to the literature by 
addressing the question of whether such funds do indeed align their trades with brokers’ 
recommendations, and the related question of whether by doing so they are able to earn 
excess returns. We achieve this by developing a methodology to integrate the stock 
holdings of mutual funds that Thomson Financial Services Inc. report quarterly, and IBES 
consensus recommendations. By analyzing the trades of equity mutual funds in 44,315 
fund-periods between 1994 and 2005, we are able to determine whether individual funds 
conduct trades that are consistent with brokers’ recommendations.   
We investigate the relation between acceptance of brokers’ recommendations and 
mutual fund performance by comparing the return distributions of two groups that we 
identify. These are the funds that align their trades with brokers’ recommendations and 
those that trade counter to recommendations. Using alternative measures of excess return, 
we determine the statistical and economic significance of the difference between their 
mean returns and thus assess the practical value of the recommendations. 
More than 20% of mutual funds conduct trades that are aligned with brokers’ 
recommendations. Further, we determine that a number of funds trade counter to these 
recommendations, and that by doing so are able to earn superior returns. We explore the 
possibility that this performance is a return on private information which is most valuable 
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when it contradicts brokers’ recommendations. Consistent with this explanation, we find 
that the greatest benefit from counter-recommendation trading is earned by funds that are 
smaller, hold less-liquid portfolios and are more actively managed. 
Section I describes the data and outlines our research procedure. In Section II we 
analyze the alignment of mutual fund trades with recommendations and how this affects 
their returns, while Section III considers funds’ stock selection and persistence of trading 
patterns.  Section IV summarizes and concludes this article. 
 
I. Data Description and Methodology 
A. Data Description 
We use mean brokers’ recommendations, which IBES reports monthly for the period 
January 1994 – December 2005. Covering the same interval, we obtain the periodic stock 
holdings of all US equity mutual funds from Thomson Financial Services Ltd. We infer 
transactions from changes to the holdings, which are most commonly reported quarterly, 
while allowing for stock capitalization changes. Daily stock price, return and turnover 
data are obtained from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and used to 
calculate quarterly excess returns and stock liquidity measures before we combine these 
with the holdings data. We also use the CRSP database as our source of mutual fund 
returns, and match these with the Thomson’s holdings data using Mutual Fund Links. 
To ensure that our data covers most of the changes to a mutual fund’s portfolio, we 
restrict our sample to funds with average equity holdings exceeding 80% and average 
cash holdings below 10% of fund investments. In a further restriction to limit data errors 
and omissions, we must be able to replicate
1
 the value of the fund’s net tangible assets 
                                                 
1
 We allow a discrepancy of up to 10%, but exclude funds outside this range. 
 6 
(NTA) by using the stock holdings data and assuming start-of-period prices for the stock 
for it to remain in our sample. 
 
B. Method 
Initially, we estimate a relation which we use to rank stocks based on the mean 
brokers’ recommendation and change in recommendation. We use this ranking to assign 
each fund’s stocks to several “broker-rank” categories. This procedure allows us to use 
regression analysis to isolate funds that incorporate these brokers’ recommendations when 
trading stocks. Finally, we compare the return performances of funds, which we identify 
as aligning their trades with brokers’ recommendations with those of funds that trade 
counter to recommendations. 
 
B.1. Ranking by brokers’ recommendation 
IBES average the recommendations of a varying numbers of brokers, which are 
coded on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is a “strong buy” recommendation. The mean 
recommendations are reported monthly, and on average, only 36% of them change in 
successive months, while over three months 59% of them change. We reason that since 
much of the information used to form the mean brokers’ recommendation is stale, funds 
may be more inclined to act on upgrades (or downgrades) of the recommendation in 
choosing stocks to buy (or sell). Notwithstanding, the level of the brokers’ 
recommendation will moderate the decision to buy based on the magnitude of an upgrade. 
That is, a one point upgrade from “buy” to “strong buy” is viewed more favorably than an 
upgrade from “sell” to “hold”. This intuition is supported by Elton, Gruber and Grossman 
(1986), who find both brokers’ recommendation and change in brokers’ recommendation 
are able to predict higher stock returns.   
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To establish the relation between changes to brokers’ recommendations, brokers’ 
recommendations and purchases of stocks by funds that we can use to rank stocks in order 
of their desirability of purchase, we perform a first pass regression. We identify stocks 
that have been traded by five or more funds in a period, and calculate the net number of 
funds that purchased the stock (the number of funds buying the stock minus the number of 
funds that were sellers) during that period for each. By using the net number of funds 
purchasing a stock, we implicitly give equal weight to the decisions of each fund 
irrespective of its size, and thus avoid a measure that is dominated by the actions of large 
funds. 
Using a pooled regression, we estimate the following relation between “net 
purchasers” and mean brokers’ recommendation and the change in the mean brokers’ 
recommendation over three months.
2
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We use the net number of funds purchasing a stock as a measure of its desirability, and 
accordingly employ the estimated model to rank stocks (broker-rank) using their mean 
brokers’ recommendation. 
                                                 
2
 We also estimate alternative models with contemporaneous mean brokers’ recommendation and up to six 
lagged terms. The above model performs similarly, and is selected because of its intuitive appeal. We also 
establish that the regression coefficients are reasonably stable over time through successive cross-sectional 
regressions. 
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B.2. Assignment to Broker-Rank Categories 
To identify changes to a fund’s asset portfolio that are aligned with brokers’ 
recommendations, we rank stocks held by a fund at the start of a period by applying 
equation (1) to the mean brokers’ recommendations. We assemble these into equal value 
portfolios (broker-rank categories) each containing 5% of the fund’s start-of-period 
holdings by value. This ensures that there is no relation between the value of the broker-
rank category and broker-rank. If trades are non-preferential with respect to broker-rank, 
then this relation should persist. 
 We jointly rank the stocks acquired by a fund during a period with those held at 
the start of the period, such that they are also assigned to one of the 20 broker-rank 
categories. The value of the stocks traded during a period is determined for each broker-
rank category, with sell trades assigned a negative value, and buy trades a positive. The 
proportion that the value of each stock broker-rank category comprises of the total value 
of stock traded by the fund during the period is then calculated. It is the relation between 
these proportions and broker-rank that we examine statistically.
3
 
 
B.3. Regression Analysis of Brokers’ Recommendation Adoptions 
The initial focus of our tests is to determine whether brokers’ recommendations are 
incorporated into a fund’s decision to trade stocks. We perform regression analysis to test 
                                                 
3
 Ideally, the portfolio would be partitioned to assign exactly 5% of the value to each stock broker-rank 
category. This rarely occurs because a particular stock holding straddles the desired partition. To address 
this issue, half the value of the holding and half the value of the stock traded are assigned to the broker-rank 
category on either side of the partition. When it is not possible to assign the stocks to 20 equal value 
categories (such as when a single stock comprises more than 5% of the value of the fund’s asset portfolio), 
stocks are assigned to ten equal value broker-rank categories. 
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the association between the proportion traded and brokers’ recommendation. An 
insignificant regression coefficient on broker-rank indicates that trades are not motivated 
by the brokers’ recommendation. 
We regress the proportion (by value) of stocks in a broker-rank category traded by a 
fund during a period, on the ranking of the category (CatRank) determined by the stocks 
held at the start of the period: 
)2(CatRankTradeProp jjj εβα ++=  
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It is worth noting that the denominator of TradePropj is simply the turnover of fund j in 
period t by value. 
These are performed on 44,315 fund-periods between January 1994 and December 
2005. By construction, similar regressions of the proportion (by value) of stocks in a 
broker-rank category held by a fund at the start of a period, on the ranking of the category 
(CatRank) would indicate that there is no relation. Accordingly, for each fund, performing 
regression equation (2) will isolate any trading during a period that is motivated by the 
brokers’ recommendations when the respective coefficients, which we term 
“recommendation betas”, are significantly negative or positive.  
In these regressions, a recommendation beta that is significantly different from zero 
could have occurred as a random event. To determine whether the count of significant 
recommendation betas from 44,315 regressions could have occurred by chance, the 
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observed count is compared with critical values obtained from the cumulative binomial 
distribution.  We use the number of regressions as the number of trials, the level of 
significance at which we find the recommendation betas to be positive or negative as the 
probability of a success, and the critical number of successes corresponding to a 
cumulative binomial probability of 1%. 
 
B.4. Fund Returns 
  For funds that possess significant brokers’ recommendation betas we obtain 
excess returns for the preceding three- and six-month intervals, the period in which the 
trades occur and the following three- and six-month intervals.  Annualized excess returns 
(AER) are calculated by subtracting the market return from the fund’s return.  We use the 
Carhart (1997), augmented model of Fama and French (1995) and estimate equation (3) 
for each fund using monthly data for the period 1994–2005. 
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Following Thompson (1978) and Cheng, Copeland, and O’Hanlon (1994), we calculate 
annualized cumulative residuals (ACR) for each fund, but instead sum the residuals from 
equation (3) for the intervals. 
 We test whether statistically significant brokers’ recommendation trades translate 
into return performance. Funds are partitioned into negative and positive recommendation 
betas. After removing return outliers exceeding three standard deviations from the 
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universal mean, we calculate the mean AER and ACR return for each, and use a t-test to 
determine whether they are statistically different. 
 
II. Trade Alignment and Returns 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I, Panel A, provides an analysis of stock returns in the three months preceding 
and three months following the IBES monthly consensus brokers’ recommendation for 
the period 1994–2005. We rank stocks into quintiles based on mean brokers’ 
recommendation. Consistent with the finding of Elton et al. (1986) that stock returns are 
positively related to the recommendation in the month of publication, we find a 
monotonic positive relation between the average return and the strength of the 
recommendation. However, in the following three months the relation is almost 
completely reversed. Individual stocks within a recommendation quintile have a wide 
range of returns as evidenced by their large standard deviations. The quintile extremities 
are characterized by the highest standard deviation and the lowest liquidity.
4
   
[Insert Table I] 
Our sample contains 2,730 distinct mutual funds, and 44,315 fund-periods that meet 
our selection and data quality criteria. Panel B also shows the distribution of days in each 
period and number of stocks in each fund. These reflect the predominance of 90-day 
periods (28,234), and a small number of funds holding a large number of stocks.  Panel C 
documents annualized excess returns (AER) and annualized cumulative residuals (ACR) 
for 20,864 fund-periods in which we can match returns. We also present returns for 
                                                 
4
 The liquidity measure for each stock has been standardized by dividing the liquidity of each stock held by 
a fund in any year by the average liquidity of all stocks held by funds for the year.. 
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partitions based on the median size, liquidity and turnover
5
, and finally, we partition on 
both size and liquidity. The arithmetic mean return of all funds over the three-month 
period following the period in which we examine fund trades is -0.5% measured by AER 
and -0.3% measured by ACR. The partitions based on size and turnover highlight minor 
differences using both AER and ACR. When measured by AER, funds with less-liquid 
portfolios outperform by 4.5%, but perform similarly when measured by ACR. The 
difference between these two measures likely reflects the superior performance of the low 
capitalization stocks over the period of the study. 
 
B. Regression Analyses 
We perform 44,315 repeat univariate linear regressions to determine if there is a 
relation between brokers’ recommendations and proportion of stocks traded by a fund 
during a period. Each regression is for one fund-period, and fund-periods with 
recommendation betas significant at the 10% level are identified. Table II, Panel A reports 
the pooled count of over the twelve-year period, while Panel B provides a breakdown by 
year. A positive recommendation beta indicates that adjustments to a fund’s portfolios 
during a period are consistent with brokers’ recommendations; highly recommended 
stocks are purchased and lowly recommended stocks are sold. A negative 
recommendation beta suggests funds are acting perversely by buying lowly recommended 
stocks and selling those with high brokers’ recommendations. 
[Insert Table II] 
                                                 
5
 For each variable, we determine the median for each year from the full sample and use these to partition 
the data.  This mitigates the bias from increasing fund size and liquidity over the 12-year period. 
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We find that brokers’ recommendations are followed by 20.7% of funds when they 
trade.
6
 Using the binomial distribution, we are able to determine that the frequency of 
positive recommendation betas in Table II, Panel A exceeds that expected by random 
occurrence. Negative recommendation betas occur four times less frequently, but the 
count also exceeds the 1% binomial critical value (Bin CV), and is, therefore, statistically 
significant. Panel B reveals that while the counts of brokers’ recommendation betas 
exhibit some variation over time, with attendant variation in the ratio of negative and 
positive betas, they are reasonably stable. 
 
C. Fund Returns 
We compare the returns of the funds that adopt the brokers’ recommendations with 
those that trade counter to them, for the period in which we observe the funds’ trades, and 
for the 3- and 6-month intervals preceding and following this period using both the AER 
and ACR measures  Our sample reduces to 20,864 fund-periods because we are unable to 
match return and holdings data, and because we eliminate fund-periods with return 
outliers. Table III documents the mean returns for each group, along with the difference 
between these means. On both measures of return, funds that trade counter to the brokers’ 
recommendations on average statistically outperform their counterparts that align their 
trades with brokers’ recommendations. With the annualized raw return exceeding the 
value weighted market portfolio by 2.2% and 2.0% over the three- and six-month 
intervals following the period of the trades, this difference is economically significant. 
                                                 
6
 The funds of interest are ones that align their trades with brokers’ recommendations that we can 
statistically confirm at the 10% level. Clearly, other funds may also follow recommendations but this 
relation is neither linear nor statistically significant. 
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Notably, the superior performance of the funds that trade counter to the recommendations 
is also apparent in the intervals preceding the period of the trades. 
A fund may exhibit a superior return performance irrespective of the alignment of its 
trades with brokers’ recommendations because of its extant stock portfolio. That is, even 
if acting counter to brokers’ recommendations reduces performance, funds that initially 
hold superior stock portfolios may continue to exhibit superior performance. This may 
also explain the superior performance of the funds trading counter to recommendations 
prior to the period in which these trades are conducted, since it cannot logically be 
attributed to the trades themselves. Notwithstanding, if the superior performance is due to 
the extant portfolio, it is not clear why funds trading counter to recommendations initially 
hold superior portfolios. As an alternative explanation, private information may have 
contributed to superior stock selection by counter-recommendation trading funds. The 
ability to acquire and use this information may be persistent, and be responsible for the 
earlier superior returns. 
 
D. Size and Liquidity Partitions 
To examine the effect of fund size and portfolio liquidity on trading preferences and 
returns, we partition our samples. Since the median fund size increases between 1994 and 
2005, we use the median for each year to split our sample into small and large funds. 
Similarly, median portfolio liquidity increases over the same period. For our measure of 
portfolio liquidity, we use a value weighted average of the liquidity of each stock held by 
a fund. The liquidity of each stock is measured by the following adaptation of the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure: 
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where 
  Stock returnit  = daily stock return; 
     Volit = daily market turnover of stock i; 
   Priceit = daily price for stock i; and 
         T = number of days in a quarter. 
 
Chen et al. (2004) find that smaller funds outperform larger funds. Panel C in Table I, 
shows that on average, small fund AERs exceed those of large funds by 1.1%, which 
confirms this result. If this can be attributed to larger funds experiencing higher trading 
costs as they suggest, then smaller funds should better able to exploit private information. 
Therefore, if the superior performance that we observe in counter-recommendation 
trading funds results from private information, then, we expect that it should be more 
pronounced in smaller funds. Accordingly, we investigate how fund size affects the 
performance of funds that align their trades with brokers’ recommendations compared to 
funds that trade counter to them. 
[Insert Table IV] 
Table IV reports frequencies and fund returns for significant brokers’ 
recommendation betas previously presented in Table III partitioned by the median fund 
size. The proportions of negative and positive recommendation betas are similar for small 
and large funds (Panel A), although smaller funds have a marginally reduced propensity 
to align trades with recommendations. Smaller funds exhibit the greatest difference 
between the returns of superior performing counter-recommendation traders compared to 
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funds with aligned trades, over the following three- and six-months (Panels B and C). At 
3.3% on AER, the magnitude of the difference between the positive and negative betas for 
small funds suggests that how the recommendation beta interacts with fund size is 
important. Return differences preceding the period of the trades however are unrelated to 
fund size. 
We also confirm the finding of Chen et al (2004) that the underperformance of larger 
funds is greater when they hold portfolios of less-liquid stocks. Panel C in Table I shows 
that on average, small funds with less-liquid portfolios outperform large funds with less-
liquid portfolios by 0.9% on AER and 1.3% on ACR, compared to differences of 0.0% on 
AER and 0.6% on ACR for more-liquid portfolios. We speculate that, if the size effect is 
accentuated when funds hold less-liquid portfolios, then the superior performance of 
negative brokers’ recommendation beta funds compared to those with positive betas may 
also be more pronounced. We reason that funds with private information may generate 
greater excess returns where the information concerns less-liquid stocks because these 
stocks react with larger price adjustments after it becomes clear to the market that they 
were previously incorrectly valued.
7
   
The results reported in Table V show that the superior performance of funds that 
trade counter to brokers’ recommendations is concentrated in the lower liquidity funds.  
Within three months, low-liquidity funds that traded counter to recommendations 
outperformed their positive recommendation counterparts by approximately 3% per 
                                                 
7
 Empirical research supports our reasoning.  Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, and Trueman (2001) argues that 
information asymmetry is greatest in low and medium capitalisation stocks and finds brokers’ 
recommendations have the greatest impact on the returns of the stocks. Further, Keim and Madhavan 
(1998) demonstrate that price adjustments from trading stocks are greatest when the stocks have low 
capitalization. 
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annum. Consistent with this, there is a marginally greater preference for lower liquidity 
funds to reject brokers’ recommendations. 
[Insert Table V] 
By way of explanation, we speculate that funds with private information about the 
stocks they trade are able to capture greater excess return when the information is not 
widely held. In the extreme, the returns will be greatest when the information runs counter 
to the more widely held opinion of the broking community. Small funds are best placed to 
exploit this information, which most valuable when it concerns the low-liquidity stocks. 
 
E. Turnover Partition 
To explore the issue of whether a fund’s performance is a function of both the fund’s 
trades during a period and its extant portfolio, we partition the funds based on median 
turnover. We expect that the returns of funds with high portfolio turnovers will be more 
attributable to the trades they conduct. Furthermore, higher turnover funds have increased 
scope to conduct trades that are value motivated, which Alexander, Cici and Gibson, 
(2007) suggest should lead to better fund performance. Therefore, these trades should be 
more cognizant of brokers’ recommendations. Panel A in Table VI shows that high 
turnover funds more readily adopt brokers’ recommendations.   
[Insert Table VI] 
From Panels B and C, it is apparent that, like low turnover funds, high turnover funds 
that adopt brokers’ recommendations perform more poorly than those that trade counter to 
recommendations, but this difference is more pronounced. This inferior performance is 
more prominent in the interval prior to the period of the trades for the higher turnover 
group. This runs counter to the intuition that the superior prior performance identified in 
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Table III is due to the extant portfolio, and is more suggestive of previous superior stock 
selection. 
Table VII highlights how the differences in fund returns based on their alignment 
with brokers’ recommendations is concentrated in funds that are small, hold less liquid 
portfolios, with higher turnovers. Despite the reduced number of observations following 
the three-way partition, the superior performance of funds that trade counter to brokers’ 
recommendations with AERs exceeding 6% for all intervals are statistically significant. In 
contrast, none of these differences are significant for the large, high liquidity, low 
turnover funds. 
[Insert Table VII] 
 
III. Stock Selection and Persistence of Trading Patterns 
A. Ex-Post Stock Selection 
To further explore how a fund’s trades versus its extant portfolio affects performance, 
we identify two groups of funds based on their ex-post stock selection. These are the 
funds that adjusted their portfolios towards acquiring stocks that performed well over the 
following three months while selling those that performed poorly, and the funds that made 
the opposite adjustment. We achieve this by applying the same methodology that we use 
to identify significant broker’s recommendation betas, but instead rank stocks by the 
stocks’ realized performance over the subsequent three-month interval. We assign the 
stocks to equal value performance categories, and regress the proportion traded in each 
category on the performance of the categories in 42,550 repeat univariate regressions. Ex-
post, we classify funds with a statistically significant (10%) positive regression coefficient 
as having achieved “good stock selection” as this indicates that the fund was successful in 
choosing stocks that perform well over the following three months. A negative coefficient 
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indicates “poor stock selection” with an adjustment of the portfolio towards poorer 
performing stocks. 
A comparison of Panels A and B of Table VIII shows that in 9.0% of fund-periods, 
funds were successful in adjusting their portfolios towards the better performing stocks, 
while 9.3% that were unsuccessful. Unsurprisingly, funds that exhibit good stock 
selection outperform funds with poor stock selection. However, this demonstrates that 
irrespective of their extant portfolio, the stocks they trade during a period affect their 
subsequent performance, with the average difference between their annualized excess 
return exceeding 11%. Between the funds that reject and accept brokers’ 
recommendations, the proportion of funds exhibiting good and poor selection is similar, 
and at around 10% is slightly elevated compared to the entire group. Between the group 
that realized poor stock selection (Panel A) and those that realized good stock selection, 
the approximate four to one ratio of funds accepting recommendations to funds that reject 
recommendations, persists. 
Panel B shows that funds that simultaneously exhibit good stock selection and reject 
brokers’ recommendations achieve annualized excess returns 8% higher than funds that 
accept brokers’ recommendations. In contrast, in Panel A, there is no significant 
difference between those that accept or reject brokers’ recommendations for funds with 
poor stock selection. Therefore, the penalty for undertaking poor stock selection is similar 
whether brokers’ recommendations are followed or not, but the reward for good stock 
selection is greatest when it runs counter to recommendations. Curiously, however, funds 
that reject brokers’ recommendations outperform those that accept them by a similar 
amount whether they exhibit good or poor selection when performance is measured by the 
four-factor Fama-French-Carhart adjusted ACR returns. 
[Insert Table VIII] 
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In turn, we partition funds by median size, liquidity and turnover and repeat the 
preceding analysis, but only report the differences between the returns of funds that reject 
and follow brokers’ recommendations in Table IX. It is apparent that smaller funds, less 
liquid funds, and funds with higher turnover are responsible for the higher AERs when 
funds that reject brokers’ recommendations exhibit good stock selectivity. Notably, for 
the smaller and less liquid funds, when performance is measured by the ACR, the 
difference is greatest for funds that exhibit poor selection (Panel A). The apparent conflict 
between the return measures; superior performance of counter recommendation traders 
with good selection on one hand and underperformance of recommendation traders that 
select poorly on the other is not observed in high turnover funds. We speculate that the 
momentum factor in the model used to produce the ACR is responsible. 
[Insert Table IX] 
 
B. Robustness of Counter-Recommendation Trading Classification 
It is possible that the funds we identify as trading counter to brokers’ 
recommendations are simply more efficient users of the information, and garner excess 
returns by first aligning their trades with the recommendations and subsequently reversing 
them. This would give the appearance of being counter-recommendation traders. To test 
this possibility, we rank the stocks in each fund-period by applying equation (1) to leading 
brokers’ recommendations. Using our procedure with the repeat regressions (equation 2), 
we investigate whether there is a relation between the yet-to-be-announced brokers’ 
recommendations and each fund’s trades.  
We cannot discount the possibility that the most common three-month period that our 
holdings data permits, is too long for us to observe trades that initially follow 
recommendations which are reversed during the period. Notwithstanding, we find that 
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less than 1.5% of funds that we previously identified as counter-recommendation traders 
align their trades with yet-to-be-announced recommendations. In contrast, 22.4% of the 
funds that we previously identified as counter-recommendation traders also trade counter 
to yet-to-be announced recommendations, significant at 10%.  
 
C. Persistence in Fund Adoption of Brokers’ Recommendations 
Our research has identified that small funds that hold less-liquid stocks with high 
portfolio turnover that trade counter to brokers’ recommendations, outperform those funds 
with similar characteristics but align their trades with recommendations. Fund size, fund 
portfolio liquidity and portfolio turnover are likely to be somewhat persistent; however for 
a trading strategy to exist, it is necessary for persistence in a fund’s propensity to trade on 
recommendations. Therefore, we examine this possibility. Table X cross-tabulates current 
period brokers’ recommendation by subsequent period recommendation. If in the current 
period, a fund accepts the brokers’ recommendations, there is a 28.5% probability that it 
will continue to do so in the subsequent period, and a 3.6% probability that it will instead 
reject recommendations. However, if a fund rejects the brokers’ recommendations in the 
current period, there is an approximately equal (11.5%) probability that in the following 
period that it will either continue to reject recommendations or accept recommendations. 
Therefore, using the alignment of a fund’s trades with brokers’ recommendations will 
unfortunately not lead to a pecuniary benefit. 
[Insert Table X] 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Integrating the stock holdings of mutual funds that Thomson Financial Services Inc. 
report quarterly, and IBES consensus recommendations, we develop a methodology to 
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examine whether a fund aligns its trades with these recommendations. The combined 
dataset covers 44,315 fund-periods between 1994 and 2005. 
We find that in more than 20% of fund-periods, funds align their trades with 
recommendations. Surprisingly, a significant proportion of funds trade counter to brokers’ 
recommendations. When we examine the returns distinguished by whether the fund aligns 
or trades counter to recommendations, it is evident that counter-recommendation trades 
generate higher excess returns. This result is robust across different definitions of excess 
return. We determine that the superior performance of counter-recommendation traders is 
most pronounced in small funds holding less-liquid stocks that trade more actively. 
We posit that a mutual fund will be reluctant to trade counter to IBES 
recommendations unless they are confident that the trades they will undertake are based 
on superior information or analysis. However, our analysis shows that ex-post, poor or 
good stock selection is equally likely. Alternatively, counter-recommendation traders 
receive the benefit of a greater price-reaction from stocks that have been misclassified by 
other analysts. Where the trades involve lesser known, low-liquidity stocks, the expected 
price reaction would be greater, and returns more easily captured by smaller funds. We 
discount the possibility that counter-recommendation traders are gambling for 
resurrection because these funds previously outperform their counterparts. 
Funds that align their trades with brokers’ recommendations are more likely to 
continue to align their trades with recommendations. However, funds that trade counter to 
recommendations are just as likely to follow recommendations as they are to trade counter 
in the following period. Thus, investing in recently counter-trading funds is unlikely to 
capitalize on the superior returns from this group, however, avoidance of funds that align 
their trades with recommendations is prudent. 
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Table I 
Descriptive Statistics 
The liquidity of each stock is measured by:  












×
−≡
∑
=
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VolicePr
returnStock
lnliquidityStock
T
1t itit
it
i
 
where: Stock returnit = daily stock return; Volit= daily market turnover of stock i; 
Priceit= daily price for stock i; and T= number of days in a quarter. 
Panel A. Stock Returns and Liquidity 
Brokers’ 
Recommendation 
Three-month excess 
return 
Excess return in 
following three 
months 
Standardized 
Log Amihud 
Liquidity 
Quintile Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean 
Highly Recommended 1 0.034 0.294 -0.004 0.291 0.971 
2 0.023 0.254 0.004 0.252 1.030 
3 0.012 0.242 0.009 0.235 1.010 
4 -0.005 0.231 0.005 0.226 1.016 
Lowly Recommended 5 -0.011 0.250 0.019 0.259 0.973 
Panel B. Fund Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Number of fund periods 44,315   
Number of Funds 2,730   
Days in Period 118 92 43 
Number of Stocks in Portfolio 154 93 239 
Panel C. Fund Returns Over Three Months Following Trading 
 N 
Annualized Excess 
Return 
Annualized 
Cumulative Residuals 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
All Fund-Periods 20,864 -0.005 0.205 -0.003 0.126 
Fund Size - Small 10,365 0.000 0.219 0.002 0.135 
Fund Size - Large 10,499 -0.011 0.191 -0.008 0.116 
Portfolio Liquidity - Low 10,458 0.017 0.243 -0.004 0.151 
Portfolio Liquidity - High 10,406 -0.028 0.155 -0.002 0.094 
Portfolio Turnover - Low 10,250 -0.008 0.195 0.000 0.115 
Portfolio Turnover - High 10,614 -0.003 0.214 -0.006 0.131 
Small, Low Liquidity 5,878 0.021 0.253 0.002 0.161 
Small, High Liquidity 4,487 -0.028 0.159 0.001 0.091 
Large, Low Liquidity 4,580 0.012 0.230 -0.011 0.137 
Large, High Liquidity 5,919 -0.028 0.151 -0.005 0.097 
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Table II 
Significant Recommendation Betas, 1994 to 2005 
The number of statistically significant (10%) recommendation betas is 
generated from linear regressions of: 
jjj CatRankTradeProp εβα ++=  
where 
j.category rank -broker in stocks ofnumber   n
and months; over three tionrecommenda brokers' mean in changecReBrok
 t;period endat  istock for  tionrecommenda brokers' meancReBrok
 ;cReBrok19.2cReBrok24.116.4 rank-brokerStock 
);
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heldstock Value
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   Recommendation Beta 
Bin CV Range Negative Positive Year N 
Min Max Count Percent Count Percent 
Panel A.  Pooled Count  1994-2005 
 44,315 2,108 2,323 2,394 5.4%*** 9,176 20.7%*** 
Panel B.  Annual Breakdown 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2,290 
2,653 
2,774 
3,656 
3,827 
3,522 
4,353 
3,837 
4,194 
4,091 
4,620 
4,498 
90 
106 
112 
152 
160 
146 
184 
160 
177 
173 
197 
192 
139 
159 
166 
214 
223 
207 
252 
225 
243 
238 
266 
260 
120 
158 
166 
173 
182 
173 
309 
251 
268 
199 
194 
201 
5.2% 
6.0%** 
6.0%*** 
4.7% 
4.8% 
4.9% 
7.1%*** 
6.5%*** 
6.4%*** 
4.9% 
4.2%*** 
4.5% 
354 
488 
583 
819 
884 
977 
1,020 
753 
867 
666 
935 
830 
15.2%*** 
18.4%*** 
21.4%*** 
22.4%*** 
23.1%*** 
27.7%*** 
23.4%*** 
19.6%*** 
20.7%*** 
16.3%*** 
20.2%*** 
18.4%*** 
Cumulative binomial distribution critical values (Bin CV) reflect a 1% 
probability that a lower (Min) or greater (Max) count occurs by chance. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels 
respectively. 
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Table III 
Mean Returns for Funds with Significant Broker Ranking Betas. 
Mean returns and their differences for 20,864 fund-periods are accompanied by their 
standard errors in parentheses. The t-distribution is used to determine the significance of the 
difference between the negative and positive mean returns. 
Interval Negative betas Positive betas Difference 
Panel A.  Annualized Excess Return  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.010 -0.028 0.038*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
3-month prior 0.013 -0.022 0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
Period 0.005 -0.024 0.029*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
3-month after 0.015 -0.007 0.022*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
6-month after 0.007 -0.013 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Panel B.  Annualized Cumulative Residuals  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.008 -0.007 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
3-month prior 0.007 -0.009 0.016*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Period -0.002 -0.008 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
3-month after 0.010 -0.009 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
6-month after 0.003 -0.006 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table IV 
Comparison of Significant Broker Recommendation Betas and Associated Return 
Differences by Fund Size. 
Mean returns and their differences are accompanied by their standard errors in 
parentheses. The t-distribution is used to determine the significance of the difference 
between the negative and positive mean returns. 
Panel A: Proportion of negative and positive recommendation betas 
  Small Funds Large Funds 
Beta Negative Positive N Negative Positive N 
Proportion 5.0% 20.3%*** 10,365 5.6%*** 21.7%*** 10,499 
 Small Funds Large Funds 
 Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference 
Panel B: Annualized Excess Return  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.002 -0.030 0.032*** 0.016 -0.026 0.043*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
3-month prior 0.006 -0.022 0.028** 0.019 -0.022 0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) 
Period -0.002 -0.023 0.022** 0.011 -0.024 0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.008) 
3-month after 0.036 0.003 0.033*** -0.003 -0.016 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
6-month after 0.021 -0.004 0.025*** -0.004 -0.021 0.017** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
Panel C: Annualized Cumulative Residuals  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.006 -0.004 0.011** 0.010 -0.009 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
3-month prior 0.002 -0.004 0.007 0.011 -0.013 0.024*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) 
Period -0.002 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.009 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
3-month after 0.024 -0.003 0.026*** -0.001 -0.014 0.013** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
6-month after 0.012 -0.001 0.013*** -0.005 -0.011 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table V 
Comparison of Significant Broker Recommendation Betas and Associated Return 
Differences by Fund Liquidity. 
Mean returns and their differences are accompanied by their standard errors in 
parentheses. The t-distribution is used to determine the significance of the difference 
between the negative and positive mean returns 
Panel A: Proportion of negative and positive recommendation betas 
  Low Liquidity Funds High Liquidity Funds 
Beta Negative Positive N Negative Positive N 
Proportion 5.6%*** 20.7*** 10,458 5.0% 21.3%*** 10,406 
 Low Liquidity Funds High Liquidity Funds 
 Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference 
Panel B. Annualized Excess Return  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.032 -0.028 0.060*** -0.016 -0.028 0.013** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
3-month prior 0.039 -0.012 0.051*** -0.016 -0.031 0.015** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
Period 0.026 -0.018 0.044*** -0.018 -0.029 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
3-month after 0.043 0.013 0.031** -0.017 -0.026 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
6-month after 0.035 0.001 0.034*** -0.023 -0.026 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Panel C: Annualized Cumulative Residuals  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.012 -0.012 0.024*** 0.004 -0.001 0.006* 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
3-month prior 0.011 -0.011 0.022*** 0.002 -0.007 0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
Period 0.001 -0.011 0.012* -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
3-month after 0.016 -0.014 0.030*** 0.004 -0.004 0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
6-month after 0.009 -0.009 0.019*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 30 
 
Table VI 
Comparison of Significant Broker Recommendation Betas and Associated Return 
Differences by Fund Turnover. 
Mean returns and their differences are accompanied by their standard errors in 
parentheses. The t-distribution is used to determine the significance of the difference 
between the negative and positive mean returns 
Panel A: Proportion of negative and positive recommendation betas 
  Low Turnover Funds High Turnover Funds 
Beta Negative Positive N Negative Positive N 
Proportion 5.8%*** 19.3*** 10,250 4.9% 22.7%*** 10,614 
 Low Turnover Funds High Turnover Funds 
 Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference 
Panel B. Annualized Excess Return  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.007 -0.015 0.021*** 0.013 -0.039 0.052*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
3-month prior 0.013 -0.019 0.032*** 0.013 -0.024 0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
Period -0.003 -0.019 0.016* 0.014 -0.028 0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
3-month after 0.011 -0.009 0.020** 0.019 -0.005 0.024** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) 
6-month after 0.001 -0.012 0.013** 0.014 -0.014 0.028*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
Panel C: Annualized Cumulative Residuals  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.011 -0.013 0.024*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
3-month prior 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.008 -0.016 0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Period -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.013 0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
3-month after 0.010 -0.005 0.015*** 0.011 -0.012 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
6-month after 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.003 -0.010 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table VII 
Comparison of Significant Broker Recommendation Betas and Associated Return 
Differences by Fund Turnover, Liquidity and Size 
Mean returns and their differences are accompanied by their standard errors in 
parentheses. The t-distribution is used to determine the significance of the difference 
between the negative and positive mean returns 
Panel A: Proportion of negative and positive recommendation betas 
  Small, LLiq, HTO Funds Large HLiq, LTO Funds 
Beta Negative Positive N Negative Positive N 
Proportion 4.2%** 22.6%*** 3,470 4.8% 22.2%*** 3,279 
 Small, LLiq, HTO Funds Large HLiq, LTO Funds 
 Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference Negative 
Beta 
Positive 
Beta 
Difference 
Panel B. Annualized Excess Return  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.041 -0.038 0.079*** -0.009 -0.019 0.010 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.018) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) 
3-month prior 0.046 -0.016 0.063*** -0.010 -0.027 0.018 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.024) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) 
Period 0.040 -0.021 0.061*** -0.007 -0.024 0.017 
 (0.021) (0.008) (0.022) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) 
3-month after 0.081 0.014 0.066*** -0.017 -0.024 0.007 
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.026) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) 
6-month after 0.071 0.010 0.061*** -0.018 -0.023 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) 
Panel C: Annualized Cumulative Residuals  1994–2005 
6-month prior 0.018 -0.011 0.029** 0.002 0.004 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
3-month prior 0.010 -0.005 0.015 -0.004 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Period 0.007 -0.012 0.019 -0.010 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
3-month after 0.031 -0.009 0.040*** 0.000 -0.007 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
6-month after 0.020 -0.004 0.024*** -0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table VIII 
Comparison of Significant Broker Recommendation Betas and Three-Month 
Returns by Stock Selection Ability 
Mean returns and their differences are accompanied by their standard errors in 
parentheses. The t-distribution is used to determine the significance of the difference 
between the reject and accept brokers’ recommendation beta’s mean returns. AER is the 
annualized (raw) excess return. ACR is the annualized cumulative (four-factor) residual 
return. 
 All Funds Reject Brokers’ 
Recommendations 
Accept Brokers’ 
Recommendations 
Difference 
 
Panel A.  Poor Realized Stock Selection 
Observations 1941 115 470  
BrokRec Prop 100% 5.9% 24.2%  
Selection Prop
1 
9.3% 10.4% 10.7%  
3-Month AER -0.056 -0.062 -0.066 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.009) (0.021) 
3- Month ACR -0.045 -0.032 -0.059 0.027** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) 
Panel B.  Good Realized Stock Selection 
Observations 1888 113 413  
BrokRec Prop 100% 6.0% 21.9%  
Selection Prop
1 
9.0% 10.2% 9.4%  
3-Month AER 0.056 0.118 0.038 0.080*** 
 (0.006) (0.027) (0.012) (0.029) 
3- Month ACR 0.030 0.042 0.021 0.021 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) 
1
 Proportions of 20,864 fund-periods for which returns can be matched, of which 1,110 
reject brokers’ recommendations and 4,381 accept. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table IX 
Three-Month Return Difference Between Significant Negative and Positive Brokers’ 
Recommendation Betas and by Stock Selection Ability, Fund Size, Liquidity and 
Turnover 
The difference between the mean returns of negative and positive brokers’ 
recommendation betas are accompanied by their standard errors in parentheses. The t-
distribution is used to determine the significance of the difference. AER is the annualized 
(raw) excess return. ACR is the annualized cumulative (four-factor) residual return. 
 Fund Size Fund Liquidity Fund Turnover 
 Small Large Low High Low High 
Panel A.  Poor Realized Stock Selection 
Observations 276 309 280 305 277 308 
AER 0.015 -0.005 0.027 -0.023 0.011 -0.015 
 (0.033) (0.029) (0.035) (0.024) (0.025) (0.038) 
ACR 0.048*** 0.008 0.081*** -0.030 0.020 0.024 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) 
Panel B. Good Realized Stock Selection 
Observations 239 287 254 272 220 306 
AER 0.106** 0.052 0.105** 0.040 0.057 0.091** 
 (0.023) (0.037) (0.044) (0.035) (0.041) (0.039) 
ACR 0.028 0.013 0.024 0.016 0.017 0.021 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table X 
Persistence in Fund Adoption of Brokers’ Recommendations 
Crosstabulation of funds’ alignment of trades with brokers’ recommendations in 
one period with their alignment in the following period. 
  Subsequent period 
  
Reject 
Recommendation Not Significant 
Accept 
Recommendation 
Total 
 
258 1,745 260 2,263 Reject 
Recommendation (11.4%) (77.1%) (11.5%) (100.0%) 
1,697 23,012 5,997 30,706 
Not Significant 
(5.5%) (74.9%) (19.5%) (100.0%) 
307 5,857 2,452 8,616 
C
u
rr
en
t 
P
er
io
d
  
  
Accept 
Recommendation (3.6%) (68.0%) (28.5%) (100.0%) 
  2,262 3,061 8,709 41,585 
  (5.4%) (73.8%) (20.7%)  
 
